A new War on the Rocks essay argues the Pentagon should move to a commercial-first spectrum model, reversing decades of US policy in which federal agencies, and the Department of Defense above all, hold prime radio frequencies while commercial operators fight for the remainder.

The argument lands at a moment of policy flux. American regulators have spent years trying to free federal spectrum for commercial 5G, and the results have been uneven. Auctions have raised tens of billions of dollars in the past, but the pipeline of new mid-band assignments has narrowed, and carriers say the shortage now constrains network capacity planning.

Why does the author want the Pentagon to change?

The essay's core claim is structural. The Pentagon, in the author's framing, treats spectrum as an entitlement rather than an asset with alternatives. Defense systems can often be re-engineered, re-banded or shared. Commercial mobile networks, by contrast, serve hundreds of millions of subscribers and cannot simply move once equipment is deployed.

The proposed remedy is a commercial-first model. Under such a regime, regulators would allocate new spectrum to commercial use by default, and federal users would need to justify retention, demonstrate efficient use, or adopt sharing arrangements. That inverts the current burden of proof, in which commercial bidders must first show that clearing or sharing is feasible.

For spectrum practitioners, the shift would matter in three ways:

• More mid-band inventory could reach auction, the band class most operators rely on for 5G capacity and coverage balance.
• Sharing frameworks, rather than full clearing, could become the default transition path for federal bands.
• Procurement discipline at defense agencies would tighten, since incumbency alone would no longer guarantee a band.

What does the current system cost?

The author frames the status quo as a strategic liability, not merely an economic inefficiency. Spectrum tied up in federal assignments generates no auction revenue, no consumer capacity and no competitive pressure on equipment vendors. The essay positions this as an opportunity cost paid by the entire wireless economy.

The commercial side has made this case before. US operators and their suppliers have long argued that defense reluctance to release mid-band spectrum slowed the country's 5G build relative to markets that cleared equivalent bands earlier. Regulators have responded with sharing regimes and voluntary relocation deals, but the essay treats those as piecemeal fixes rather than the systemic reform it advocates.

Is reform likely?

Obstacles remain substantial. Military radar, satellite control links, weapons telemetry and command systems occupy wide swaths of prime spectrum. Relocation is expensive, and Congress must typically authorize incentive payments to move federal users. Past transitions have shown that defense agencies will exchange spectrum only when funded to do so.

The essay acknowledges none of this happens quickly. Its contribution is to reframe the debate: spectrum held by default is spectrum wasted, and the Pentagon gains more from a disciplined, market-facing approach than from silent incumbency.

Whether Washington adopts a commercial-first default or continues case-by-case negotiation, the pressure on federal holdings will shape US spectrum policy, and carrier capacity plans, for years ahead.